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TAMING TECHNOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PUBLIC
ACCESS DOCTRINE: NEW JERSEY’S AMENDED RULE 1:38
Kristin M. Makar

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

“Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they
1
could, they didn’t stop to think if they should.” This quote by Dr.
Ian Malcolm, a character in Steven Spielberg’s thriller, Jurassic Park,
describes the enthusiastic power of both discovery and innovative
technological development, while cautioning against the dangers of
technology. Although public access to court documents via the Internet does not begin to breach the subject of breeding dinosaurs, it
does share the same pioneering spirit enveloping the technological
possibilities of which Dr. Malcolm warned. Similarly, the debate over
public access to court records through the Internet, which is part of a
larger debate regarding the intersection between law and technology,
embodies an inherent conflict between technological capabilities on
the one hand and moral, ethical, and legal limitations on the other
hand. In particular, because the Internet has the power to alter the
public access doctrine by greatly expanding its capacity, it illuminates
the legal tension between public access rights and individual privacy
rights. As the Internet changes the way that society envisions business
and pleasure, state and federal courts, forced to act as experimenters,
are reflecting on their public access procedures and reviewing potential changes.
In July 2009, the Supreme Court of New Jersey amended New
2
Jersey Court Rule 1:38 by completely rewriting and revising the
framework of the public access doctrine under former Rule 1:38.
The amended Rule fundamentally alters the former Rule’s framework and the public access doctrine itself because it presumes that all
court records are open for public access with the exclusion of some
∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008,
Gettysburg College. I wish to thank Professor Robert Martin for his supervision and
Seth Fersko for his comments and assistance.
1
JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).
2
N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (2009).
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records contained in its comprehensive and exclusive list of excep3
tions. In effect, New Jersey courts will no longer struggle with the
common law “balancing of the interests” test to determine when certain records should be available for public inspection because a presumption of openness applies unless the type of record is specifically
4
addressed in the exceptions.
More significantly, although the
amended Rule does not address Internet accessibility explicitly in its
provisions, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the recommendations of its self-appointed committee, the Special Committee
5
on Public Access to Court Records (the “Committee”), which advocate for the expansion of public access rights through remote elec6
tronic access to court documents.
The recommendations approved by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey address the amended Rule’s failure to acknowledge Internet
accessibility explicitly in its provisions. Specifically, the recommendations, advising the court to create and periodically review its policies
governing the posting of court documents on the Internet, permit
the court to issue policy guidelines consistent with the presumption
7
of openness motivating the amended Rule. This grant of discretion,
combined with the ambiguity in the amended Rule itself, creates an
opportunity for the court to consider the conflict between public
access rights and individual privacy concerns when drafting its guidelines relating to Internet accessibility. This necessarily invokes a re3

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
5
SUPREME COURT OF N.J., ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS BY THE SUPREME
COURT ON THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS 1 (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/AlbinCommitteeRule_138AdministrativeD
eterminations_by_the_Supreme_Court.pdf
[hereinafter
ADMINISTRATIVE
DETERMINATIONS].
6
See id. at 6 (adopting a policy of posting civil-docket and criminal-conviction
information on the Internet and determining additional categories for posting in the
future). As of December 2010, the New Jersey Judiciary website did not maintain a
mechanism to view court documents through remote electronic access, but it did
provide information about locating specific documents in accordance with Rule 1:38.
Copies of Court Records, N.J. COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/superior/copies
_court_rec.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2010).
7
SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS,
REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMM. ON PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS
15 (2007), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/publicaccess/publicaccess.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT] (“Given the rapid changes in technology, the Supreme Court
should determine on a periodic basis the appropriate court data for posting on the
Internet and for release in bulk electronic form. The Supreme Court should make
those determinations on an administrative basis without amending the public access
rule.”).
4
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view of First Amendment and common law jurisprudence as the debate over how courts should incorporate technology into the public
access doctrine continues among scholars, courts, and the public.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court of New Jersey
must consider certain consequences and unanswered questions
raised by amended Rule 1:38’s alteration of the public access doctrine
and pro-Internet initiatives, and it further proposes recommendations and solutions to these quandaries. Four circumstances exist in
which the amended Rule’s innovation raises perplexities. First, the
Rule requires the parties to redact any confidential personal identifiers from documents submitted to the court, but it fails to provide an
enforcement mechanism to punish a party’s lack of compliance.
Second, Internet posting incentivizes parties to draft sealing motions
to protect information that practical obscurity once protected, and
the Rule’s strict sealing standard may force parties to make incomplete records or to turn to private forums for conflict resolution.
Third, the timing of Internet release is undefined and raises questions about the Rule’s applicability to records created before the Rule
became effective, as well as when the Rule requires courts to release
the records during a case. Finally, the question of creation and maintenance costs to support an Internet-user system is of particular concern as the State’s debt continues to increase.
Permitting public access to court documents in the courthouse is
fundamentally different from widely publishing such information
over the Internet. This Comment does not advocate for a change in
the traditional public access doctrine, but it argues only that courts
treat remote electronic records differently than paper records. With
the understanding that the Supreme Court of New Jersey supports
and intends to begin posting at least some of its court records on the
Internet, this Comment offers guidelines that the Supreme Court of
New Jersey should consider when drafting the appropriate policies
governing Internet accessibility. The recommendations proffered in
this Comment focus on: drafting an enforcement provision to ensure
compliance with the redaction requirements; restricting Internet
access only to court-generated documents; limiting the release of
court documents on the Internet to records created after the effective
date of the amended Rule and not until the final disposition of the
case; maintaining user fees to offset costs; and creating a log-in procedure before a court grants access. Contemplation of these policy
recommendations will help ensure the proper balance between public access rights and individual privacy rights.
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Part II of this Comment explains the history of the public access
doctrine, in particular the sources of public access rights, decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, and the underlying policy
rationales for providing public access to court documents. Although
the founding constitutional principles for the public access doctrine
and Supreme Court decisions often focus on the public’s right to attend criminal trials, rather than directly on the public’s right to inspect criminal or civil court documents, lower courts have used the
same rationale to extend the right to court documents and civil cas8
es. Part III examines the competing arguments over whether remote
electronic access to court documents is more beneficial than harmful
in the struggle between public access rights and individual privacy
rights. Part IV analyzes New Jersey’s former and amended Rule 1:38,
which governs public access to court records, and it reviews the limited New Jersey case law on the public access doctrine. Finally, Part
V addresses the possible consequences and unanswered questions
raised by amended Rule 1:38, especially as they relate to the tension
between protecting public access rights and individual privacy rights.
Part V also recommends guidelines that the Supreme Court of New
Jersey should consider when drafting its Internet policy in the face of
a new and explicit presumption of openness.
II. HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE
The public access doctrine is deeply rooted in the historical notion that trials are public events. Courts support their determinations
in favor of public access rights based on First Amendment and common law principles. In several prominent cases, the Supreme Court
of the United States has held that the public has either a First
Amendment right or a common law right to access court proceedings
9
and documents. Although the Court has never confronted the discrete issue of remote electronic access to court documents, some of
its opinions have alluded to the difficulty posed by advancing tech10
nology as it relates to the public access doctrine. In recent cases, the
Court has acknowledged the concept of information privacy and the
competing interests between public access rights and individual pri11
vacy rights. In an attempt to harmonize this tension, courts fre-

8
9
10
11

See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.

MAKAR_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/16/2011 2:58 PM

COMMENT

1075

quently address the basic policy rationales that support an open judi12
cial process.
A. Sources of Public Access Rights
Two sources provide public access rights: the First Amendment
and the common law. The First Amendment public access right is a
fundamental right, which the government may limit only by demonstrating a compelling governmental interest and a limitation that is
13
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Supreme Court of the
United States established a two-prong test to determine when a First
Amendment right of public access attaches to court documents in a
criminal proceeding—when the proceeding has historically been
14
open to the public and public access promotes judicial integrity. Although the Supreme Court has not applied this test in the context of
public access to court documents in a civil proceeding, the circuit
15
courts, including the Third Circuit, apply the same logic for civil
16
proceedings.
The Supreme Court first recognized a common law right of
17
access to court documents in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
In contrast to the First Amendment right, which is subject to strict
18
scrutiny, the common law right of access requires a balancing test
19
that is easier to overcome with countervailing privacy interests. De12

See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) (“Where
. . . the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of
sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
14
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–9
(1986). The Supreme Court originally articulated and explained the two prongs in
Globe, 457 U.S. at 610–11 (applying the First Amendment test to a claim for public
access to a criminal proceeding).
15
The Third Circuit is particularly notable because New Jersey is in the Third
Circuit.
16
See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the First Amendment right of access applies equally to criminal and civil trials); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980)
(“[H]istorically[,] both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open.”).
17
435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
18
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982).
19
See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Further,
both the common law and First Amendment standards ultimately involve a balancing
test, and the First Amendment right of access receives more protection than the
common law right.”); United States v. McDougal, 103 F.3d 651, 657–58 (8th Cir.
1996) (noting that the strong presumption of access applies for a First Amendment
access right but not for a common law right); Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp.,
13
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spite the differences in the strength of the presumption and the degree of difficulty in rebutting the presumption, most courts hesitate
to decide the constitutional issue and instead elect to rely on the
20
common law analysis.
B. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States Concerning the
Public Access Doctrine
The Supreme Court has never heard a case addressing the issue
of remote electronic access to court documents. To understand the
current debate over Internet accessibility to court documents, however, one must explore the holistic development of the public access
doctrine. The modern public access doctrine developed when the
Supreme Court decided several seminal cases in the 1970s and 1980s.
In one of the earliest cases, Whalen v. Roe, the Court recognized a
21
constitutional right to information privacy.
Although the Court
upheld a state statute requiring the storage of centralized computer
files to record patient information, the Court framed the debate as:
(1) the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and (2) the
22
interest in independence in making important decisions. Perhaps
more notably, in light of the modern debate regarding the intersection of law and technology, Justice Brennan, in his concurrence,
noted that “[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information,
and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not dem23
onstrate the necessity of some curb on technology.” The majority
and the concurring opinions suggest that courts apply a different privacy right or a different level of privacy when electronic files are subject to public inspection and when dissemination of personal matters
is more prolific.
855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988) (comparing the standards to overcome the right of
access under the common law and the First Amendment).
20
Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 320 (1999). This proposition is consistent with the concept of constitutional avoidance, which is the idea that courts will
avoid determining the constitutionality of an issue unless no other alternative foundation exists on which to make a decision. See Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932) (“[E]ven if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.”).
21
See 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (recognizing that the right to collect data for public purposes is accompanied by a corollary duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures,
and sometimes such a duty “arguably has its roots in the Constitution”).
22
Id. at 600–01.
23
Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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In 1978, the Court decided a second case, Nixon, which recognized a common law right of access to court documents but cautioned that the right is not absolute, particularly when the individu24
al’s interest to restrict access outweighs the public’s interest. The
Court pronounced that each individual court has supervisory power
over its own records and that courts have the discretion to deny
access when courts determine that documents may become a vehicle
25
for improper purposes. After this decision, several federal courts
began to recognize a common law right of access as creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of public access to documents filed in
26
connection with a pretrial motion. The circuit courts are split, how27
ever, as to the type of document to which the presumption attaches.
In the early 1980s, the Court decided two cases that focused on
the First Amendment right of access to court proceedings but that also informed the debate regarding public access rights in the context
of court documents and civil proceedings. In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, the Court held that criminal trials must be open to the
28
public under the protection of the First Amendment. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the Court articulated the appropriate considerations to determine when a First Amendment right of access exists for criminal proceedings: whether the proceeding has been

24
See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 610–11 (1978) (holding that the litigant’s individual interests to restrict access outweighed the common
law public right to access tapes released during the trial).
25
Id. at 598. The Court provided examples of when documents may become a
vehicle for improper purposes, including promoting public scandal, encouraging
libelous statements, or revealing harmful business information. Id.
26
See F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying the common law standard to financial statements introduced in an adjudicatory proceeding and permitting public access); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savs. Ass’n
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying the common law standard to settlement agreement papers and permitting access); In re
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying the
common law standard and permitting the removal of exhibits from the public court
file to protect privacy and identity); Crystal Grower’s Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458,
461 (10th Cir. 1980) (applying the common law standard to a party’s brief and keeping it under seal).
27
Compare Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d
Cir. 1993) (holding that the mere filing of documents creates the presumption of
public access), with United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the presumption applies only to documents used in adjudicating the case),
and Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the presumption applies to those documents relevant to the functioning of the judiciary).
28
448 U.S. 555, 575, 581 (1980) (discussing the long history of open trials during
the enactment of the First Amendment and holding that the criminal trial at issue
must be open to the public).
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historically open to the public and whether the right of access plays a
29
significant role in the functioning of the judicial process. The Supreme Court rearticulated these considerations in a subsequent case
regarding a claimed First Amendment right of access to court docu30
ments.
Finally, in the most recent case addressing the public access doctrine, United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Communication for
Freedom of the Press, the Court held that a request for records stored by
the government, rather than shedding light on the functioning of the
31
government, was an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Although the
32
Court decided the case under the Freedom of Information Act and
33
the case did not directly pertain to court documents, the Court ad34
dressed privacy concerns related to the public access doctrine. The
Court stated, “Plainly there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse
files . . . and a computerized summary located in a single clearing35
house of information.” The Court concluded that common law understandings of privacy include an individual’s control of information
36
concerning his person. As in Whalen, the Court suggested that electronic records raise different concerns from traditional paper records
in the context of privacy and the public access doctrine.
C. The Rationale Underlying the Public Access Doctrine
Five fundamental policy rationales exist to justify providing pub37
lic access to court proceedings and documents. These policy ratio29
457 U.S. 596, 605–06 (1982). This is often referred to as the “experience and
logic” test. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 9
(1986).
30
See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9, 13 (applying the test to a claim for public
access to court transcripts of a preliminary hearing and holding that the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials applies to preliminary hearings).
31
489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (holding that the invasion was unwarranted under
the Freedom of Information Act because the request was not made to obtain official
information about a government agency, but only to retrieve records stored by the
government).
32
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
33
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 751, 780.
34
See id. at 764 (discussing the definition of privacy as information unavailable to
the public and differentiating between scattered information and compiled information in relation to privacy matters).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 763.
37
Peter W. Martin, The New “Public Court”: Online Access to Court Records—From
Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855, 857–58 (2008).
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nales guide courts in their analyses under both the First Amendment
and the common law tests. The principles are salient because they
transcend technological differences and because they inform many of
the arguments in favor of treating paper and remote electronic
records equally.
First, a policy endorsing public access guarantees that court pro38
ceedings are fair, enhancing public confidence in the judiciary.
Public confidence ensures judicial independence because increased
transparency limits the prospect of public attack which may under39
mine judicial autonomy. Second, public access allows citizens to
monitor and scrutinize the judiciary, administering judicial accoun40
tability to ensure proper judicial performance. Third, open access
provides a forum for public concerns relating to crime, including an
opportunity for the public to view courts dispensing justice properly
41
to vindicate their concerns. Fourth, open access promotes public
education about the functions and processes of the judiciary in its
42
decision-making capacities. And fifth, public access ensures that the
discussion of governmental affairs is an informed one and helps citizens actively participate and contribute to their government to the
43
extent that they understand how courts enforce society’s laws.
III. THE DEBATE OVER REMOTE ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO COURT
DOCUMENTS
The debate concerning electronic access penetrates the forefront of the public access doctrine because of the recent advances in
modern technology. Juxtaposed between First Amendment and
common law rights and individual notions of privacy, the arguments
38

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980).
T.S. Ellis, III, Systematic Justice: Sealing, Judicial Transparency and Judicial Independence, 53 VILL. L. REV. 939, 948 (2008).
40
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
41
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508–09
(1984).
Criminal acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern,
even outrage and hostility; this in turn generates a community urge to
retaliate and desire to have justice done. When the public is aware that
the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning,
an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions.
Id.
42
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[F]ree and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can contribute to public
understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system . . . .”).
43
Globe, 457 U.S. at 604–05.
39
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supporting and opposing remote electronic access illuminate the
broader debate over law and technology. While these issues are not
distinct from the landmark cases decided by the Supreme Court in
the 1970s and 1980s, today’s courts must view the issue in light of improving technology and the vast capabilities of the Internet.
Prior to the 1990s, when the Internet began generating significant usership, the general public could not retrieve data effortlessly
44
with the click of a mouse. The modern Internet, with its capacity to
disseminate information instantly worldwide, has been the source of
significant legal debate. In the public access area, the Internet has
generated questions about the effect of advancing technology on privacy rights because it makes personal information immediately accessible, and despite this problem, courts are turning to the Internet,
instead of the clerk’s office, to provide the public with access to court
records. More significantly, the debate over remote electronic access
to court documents sheds light on just how far society is willing to
engage the legal system in the technological phenomenon, perhaps
ever so mindful of Dr. Malcolm’s heed.
The proliferation of the Internet revolution has forced legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies to devise laws, rules, and
policies to address the role the Internet should play in administering
justice. The debate focuses on two discrete proposals for the treatment of electronic records. One ideology is to treat remote electronic records the same as paper records and thereby ignore, or at least
45
nullify, technological distinctions. The other position advocates limiting remote electronic access to court documents while maintain46
ing the complete paper record on file at the courthouse. This approach recognizes the different roles that technology plays in the
legal system. Advocates of both positions do not propose eliminating
or reducing traditional public access to court documents, which
47
would conflict with existing case law. Rather, the disagreement resides in whether traditional notions of openness extend equally
beyond paper records at the courthouse, protected to some extent by

44

MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNET,
BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY 12, 16–17 (2001).
45
OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRIVACY AND
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 9–10 (1999).
46
Id.
47
See supra Part II.B.
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48

practical obscurity, to remote electronic records posted on the Internet.
A. Arguments in Favor of Equal Treatment of Paper and Remote
Electronic Records
Proponents advocating for equal treatment of paper and remote
electronic records reject the idea that the Internet changes the legal
landscape in the public access doctrine. In effect, these proponents
argue that the principle of openness inherent with paper records
49
should evolve to include remote electronic records. The argument
50
is predominantly one of increased judicial transparency, but suppor51
ters proffer several arguments involving issues of equality, public
52
53
policy, attorney and client benefits, and administrative conveni54
ence. Given all of the arguments, the focus on equality is perhaps
the most remarkable in light of the emphasis on fairness and equality
offered in the American justice system. The argument contends that
equal treatment of paper and remote electronic records levels the
playing field geographically, temporally, and indiscriminately for par55
ties and the interested public at large.
Public policy propositions often evoke the basic policy rationales
56
that support public access to court documents and proceedings. For
instance, proponents of equal treatment argue that remote electronic
access offers the public the ability to aggregate and combine court
48

Practical obscurity refers to the idea that court documents remain open to the
public to the extent that interested individuals are willing to travel to the courthouse,
wait in line, search through records, and pay copying fees to access information. Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age
of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 316 (2004).
49
See DAVID RAUMA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REMOTE PUBLIC ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC
CRIMINAL CASE RECORDS: A REPORT ON A PILOT PROJECT IN ELEVEN FEDERAL COURTS 15
(2003), available at http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/remotepa.pdf (commenting that chief judges, clerks, and defense attorneys regard remote public access as
reinforcing the idea that courts are an “open, public institution”).
50
See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
51
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
52
See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
53
See infra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
54
See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
55
See RAUMA, supra note 49, at 15 (noting that equal access levels the playing field
for attorneys who cannot easily access the courthouse); Lynn M. LoPucki, CourtSystem Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 514 (2009) (arguing that equal access levels
the playing field by making the same information available to all parties); Martin, supra note 37, at 858 (suggesting that equal treatment ensures equal access for those
unable to physically attend the proceedings).
56
See supra Part II.C.
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data to stimulate public debate on important policy issues. Additionally, advocates insist that remote electronic access, because of its
wide audience and transparency function, aids citizens in under58
standing the laws by which they are required to live. Similarly, remote electronic access exposes and reduces corruption because the
public is capable of monitoring the judiciary and imposing appropri59
ate accountability.
Advocates also advance several other public policy arguments.
First, supporters assert that remote access to an electronic database
helps promote due diligence and market research because of the
ease with which information flows, which enhances the quality of
60
business transactions and legal services. A second proposition contends that the transparency achieved through remote electronic
access demonstrates to legislatures how courts are implementing
their laws and permits the legislatures to address and correct inter61
pretive discrepancies. Third, expansive public access through remote electronic methods helps form and shape societal norms in the
62
context of law and justice observed in courts. In particular, transparency has contributed to the condemnation of sexual harassment and
63
domestic violence. Finally, some proponents argue that providing
remote access to the public discourages data re-sellers from copying
and selling the information online for profit, thereby undermining
64
any privacy protections maintained for the general public.
57

Compare Martin, supra note 37, at 859 (“Debate on important policy issues can
also be aided by review of multiple cases of a particular type.”), with Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982) (noting that public access
promotes informed discussion and encourages citizen participation).
58
Compare LoPucki, supra note 55, at 484–85 (“It would expand the power of citizens and legislators over the courts and make the actual rules that govern society visible to the public.”), with Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (positing that public access educates the public about the
laws and the judicial system).
59
Compare LoPucki, supra note 55, at 485 (arguing that transparency exposes and
reduces corruption and provides a basis for the public to evaluate the judiciary), with
Globe, 457 U.S. at 606 (mentioning that public access permits the public to monitor
and scrutinize the judiciary).
60
Martin, supra note 37, at 868.
61
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 496–97.
62
Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public
Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 383 (2006).
63
Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of
Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 536–37 (2006).
64
SUBCOMM. ON PRIVACY & PUB. ACCESS TO ELEC. CASE FILES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT ON PRIVACY AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO
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In addition to public policy arguments, advocates of equal
treatment highlight the benefits of remote electronic access for attorneys and their clients. Remote electronic access reduces the price
of legal services because electronic documents serve as a “form book”
65
for attorneys to conveniently copy thereby saving time and effort. In
fact, the argument extends beyond the mere cost advantages for legal
services. Remote electronic access reveals patterns to help attorneys
66
predict the outcomes of litigation. Predictability has two benefits.
First, predictability informs litigation strategy and facilitates settle67
Second, and more broadly,
ment based on expected outcomes.
predictability increases societal productivity by promoting private
68
economic planning in accordance with the certainty of outcomes.
Finally, another set of arguments underscores the administrative
convenience served by equal treatment. In one instance, remote
electronic access has the potential to reduce common errors made by
attorneys by detecting missing information, redacting sensitive information automatically, and reminding attorneys about filing dead69
lines. This, of course, would require certain informational systems
to create the appropriate functional technology. In response to the
opponents’ arguments about the cost to implement technologies and
proper databases, proponents suggest outsourcing the labor and
maintenance to private or public sector groups so as not to burden
70
courts or the public. Advocates also highlight that both the federal
courts and Congress have successfully embraced equal access of elec71
tronic and paper records through the E-Government Act of 2002
and the implementation of the Public Access to Court Electronic
72
Records (PACER) system.
ELECTRONIC CASE FILES 7 (2001) (amended 2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE].
65
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 534.
66
Id. at 498–99.
67
Id. at 506–07.
68
Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and “Clear Reflection of Income”:
What Constrains Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 456–57 n.52 (1999).
69
LoPucki, supra note 55, at 511.
70
Martin, supra note 37, at 880.
71
44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).
72
Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and the
Question of Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV. 175, 203
(2004); see also Martin, supra note 37, at 864 (“The federal courts did not establish
computer-based case management systems or subsequent electronic filing and document management systems in order to provide the public with better access to court
records. Those systems were created because they offered major gains for judges and
court administrators.”).

MAKAR_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1084

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/16/2011 2:58 PM

[Vol. 41:1071

B. Arguments in Favor of Restricting Remote Electronic Access to Court
Documents
Opponents of equal treatment for paper and remote electronic
records recognize that there is something inherently dissimilar about
the methods of access to court documents. The disparities between
paper records and remote electronic records involve several issues,
including administration and cost, public safety, and litigation, discrimination, and privacy concerns. Opponents do not necessarily object to a policy permitting remote electronic access to court documents in its entirety, but rather, they argue that unfettered access is
undesirable. While many of the arguments focus on the unique
problems of remote electronic access, other concerns are present
with respect to paper records as well, and these concerns may be further exacerbated in the electronic context.
One significant argument for opponents, which is also one of
the most difficult questions posed to proponents of equal access, is
the question of the cost of the technological infrastructure required
to maintain electronic databases that provide remote access to the
public. The cost issue expands beyond the necessary technological
equipment and addresses certain labor concerns, such as converting
paper files to electronic files and hiring personnel to provide security
73
and maintenance for the databases. The cost issue has intensified as
legislatures and courts determine whether to charge the public for
74
remote electronic access, and if so, how to establish fee systems.
Aside from monetary costs, remote electronic access to court documents raises concerns about the administrative burdens of physically
providing access to databases and the increased opportunities for
75
clerical error and data-entry mistakes. The questions of administrative burdens, accountability, and responsibility become important
with the introduction of redaction requirements into the public
access doctrine.

73

MARTHA WADE STEKETEE & ALAN CARLSON, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & THE
JUSTICE MGMT. INST., DEVELOPING CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO
COURT RECORDS: A NATIONAL PROJECT TO ASSIST STATE COURTS 8 (2002) [hereinafter
CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES].
74
See Victoria S. Salzmann, Are Public Records Really Public?: The Collision Between the
Right to Privacy and the Release of Public Court Records over the Internet, 52 BAYLOR L. REV.
355, 375–76 (2000) (discussing the dilemma states face as they determine how to
provide electronic access to the public).
75
See id. at 375 (“Although clerical error has long been dealt with by the courts,
the introduction of computer technology brings forth a renewed opportunity for data entry mistakes.”).
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Opponents also make several arguments highlighting how remote electronic access compromises public safety. For example, one
concern is that the public, fearful of the release of private information over the Internet, might hesitate to comply with the govern76
ment. This is particularly apparent in two different circumstances.
First, it raises a possibility that victims and witnesses will hesitate to
77
come forward and citizens will be unwilling to serve as jurors.
Second, access to sensitive information may result in decreased suspect cooperation, which in turn could increase the number of cases
78
that proceed to trial in lieu of disposal through plea agreements.
An additional public safety concern posits that remote electronic
access to personal information increases and eases the opportunity
79
for mischievous viewers to commit identity theft. Furthermore, posting court records on the Internet may entice blackmail, stalking, ex80
tortion, and other crimes that threaten public safety.
Opponents also focus on litigation concerns generated with a
policy allowing remote electronic access to court documents. One
concern is that posting court records on the Internet will burden
courts further because of increased litigation by parties raising motions to seal records or requesting protective orders to shield their
81
private information from public viewing. A second concern introduces the possibility that Internet posting might increase pretrial
publicity and taint the jury pool, which would perhaps prejudice the
82
parties’ right to a fair trial. As advanced technology enhances communication through wireless networks and smart phones, serious ap-

76

Id. at 377.
Winn, supra note 48, at 328–29.
78
See Letter from Michael A. Battle, Dir., Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to James C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Dec. 6,
2006) (suggesting that placing documents online creates a “cottage industry” that
republishes court records on websites exposing cooperators and leads to targeting
witnesses, intimidation, harassment, and retaliation).
79
Winn, supra note 48, at 317.
80
Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability
with Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access Policies and A
Proposal for South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. REV. 81, 83 (2006).
81
See Winn, supra note 48, at 326 (arguing that federal courts may experience increased litigation demanding motions to seal or protective orders under the PACER
system).
82
See George F. Carpinello, Public Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience
Under Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule’s Future in a World of Electronic Filing, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 1089, 1108 (2003) (discussing the problems of pretrial publicity and tainting the
jury pool on the parties’ right to a fair trial, particularly in cases that generate significant public attention).
77
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prehension about jurors accessing the Internet and case information
83
prior to or during trials creates cause for concern.
A fourth point of contention addressed by opponents regarding
the consequences of permitting remote electronic access to court
documents concentrates on discrimination. Opponents argue that
remote electronic access may promote inequality because litigants
with the resources to resort to private judicial forums will have the
option to do so, particularly if they have sensitive privacy concerns,
while the remaining public must choose to either forego justice or li84
tigate in the public courts. This represents the phenomenon of the
“vanishing trial” and recognizes the potential for an increase in liti85
gants seeking alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. In
fact, there may be a correlation between the expanding public access
doctrine and the increase in contracts drafted with mandatory arbitration clauses to avoid public disclosures, and such clauses are po86
tentially harmful to consumers.
Another discrimination concern raises the idea that widespread
availability of court information over the Internet may encourage
employers and other entities to search and ultimately discriminate
87
based on information present in the court documents. For example, ChoicePoint Inc., a private company, has compiled and aggregated data on millions of individuals from various public records,
which the government and employers use to screen and investigate

83
Mary Flood, Windows Opening and Doors Closing—How the Internet is Changing
Courtrooms and Media Coverage of Criminal Trials, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 429, 431 (2009);
John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2009, at A1.
84
See Lewis A. Kaplan, J., S.D.N.Y., Litigation, Privacy and the Electronic Age, 4 YALE
SYMP. L. & TECH. 1 (2001) (discussing the growing dissatisfaction with privacy mechanisms in the public courts, particularly in the electronic age, and the competing
privacy benefits of alternative dispute resolution methods for those who can afford
it); Winn, supra note 48, at 328–29.
The world of cyber-justice should not be permitted to degenerate into
a world . . . where the rich can seek out private judicial forums to resolve their disputes, while the poor and middle classes are faced with
an impossible choice—either foregoing justice to maintain their privacy and security; or permitting their sensitive personal information to be
commercialized or stolen, and allowing the intimate details of their
personal lives to be made available all over the Internet.
Id.
85
Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding
of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 444–45 (2009).
86
Id. at 445–46.
87
James B. Jacobs, Restorative Justice: Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 387, 394, 401–02 (2006).
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88

current and prospective employees. Although the question of how
ChoicePoint accessed this information in the past remains unclear,
whether it accessed information through paper or electronic records,
one can only imagine that remote electronic access to court documents will hasten and simplify the task.
A final area of concern relates to privacy rights and reaches the
core of the First Amendment and common law disputes over the public access doctrine. Much of the conflict between proponents and
opponents of remote access reveals the tension between public access
rights and individual privacy rights. The question of privacy protection permeates all areas of law but is particularly controversial, especially with modern technology, in this area of information privacy. In
Whalen, the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that priva89
cy includes the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
More significantly, the Court suggested that the duty to avoid unwar90
ranted disclosures “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.” Additionally, in Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court noted
that common law understandings of privacy include the premise that
91
an individual has control over information concerning his person.
The struggle to define the appropriate balance between privacy and
public access rights is even more ambiguous because the Supreme
Court held that every court has supervisory power over its own
92
records.
One of the more significant privacy concerns that opponents
raise to justify differential treatment focuses on the decline of prac93
tical obscurity. More specifically, the practical obscurity of court
records combined with the physical limitations of paper composition
and storage capabilities creates an expectation of privacy that withers
94
away with electronic records that are potentially available forever.
Arguably, this expectation of privacy due to practical obscurity and
past technological limitations made additional protections for infor88
Daniel J. Solove, Modern Studies in Privacy Law: Notice, Autonomy and Enforcement
of Data Privacy Legislation: Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (2002).
89
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977).
90
Id. at 605.
91
United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989).
92
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
93
See discussion supra note 48.
94
Id. at 316–17 (discussing a new concern in the electronic age about escaping
the past and burying skeletons in the closet only for them to resurface many years
later in an Internet search).
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mation contained in court documents unnecessary—nonetheless, as
the Internet continues to change the shape of communications, opponents argue that the time has come to revisit Justice Brennan’s forewarning in Whalen and to reexamine the meaning of privacy and
95
methods to ensure adequate privacy protection.
Practical obscurity also serves an important role in minimizing
the potential damage resulting from a mistake in the record. When
records on the Internet contain mistakes, courts and citizens do not
96
have the means to undo the damage. With paper records, viewership is limited; however, with online dissemination, the chance that
millions of people will have access to the information before parties
97
and courts correct it is significantly greater. Even if the responsible
parties eventually correct the mistake, the courts and Internet viewers
may have electronically stored and further disseminated incorrect
versions. According to opponents, the risk of mistakes and Internet
dissemination is disturbing because many individuals appear in court
98
records involuntarily. Generally, non-litigants do not have the opportunity to defend allegations and their reputations before the court
99
to protect their interests.
Providing remote electronic access to court documents also
threatens individual privacy by providing viewers with the opportunity
and ability to easily aggregate and disseminate information gleaned
from online court documents at low costs, leading to the potential
100
commercialization of court records. The advancements made possible by the Internet encourage privatization of public information by
101
Alenterprises engaged in the lucrative data-mining industry.
though the data-mining industry evolved before the Internet and
95

See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 48, 94
and accompanying text.
96
Marder, supra note 85, at 446–47.
97
Id.
98
See Natalie Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records—Balancing Public Access
and Privacy, 51 LOY. L. REV. 365, 410 (2005) (arguing that people required to appear
in court often do not willingly volunteer to participate in a public process). This argument may be less compelling for litigants, who arguably consent to publicizing
their information presented in the court and who may have some control over what
information is, in fact, presented.
99
Carpinello, supra note 82, at 1107.
100
See Winn, supra note 48, at 316 (“Information in many different locations can
be combined and aggregated in ways that previously were impossible, permitting entirely new uses of the information that could never have been intended before.”).
101
See Gomez-Velez, supra note 98, at 378, 415–16 (discussing the virtual privatization of public information and vendor interest in reselling information found in
court records).
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electronic recordkeeping came to fruition, posting court documents
online will increase the ease with which such information is accessed
and aggregated.
C. Committee Reports and Positions
As courts and legislatures confront the intersection of technology and the public access doctrine, various committees have circulated
guidelines and reports in response to the quandary. Two committees
in particular have issued influential and conflicting reports: the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management on Privacy and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (“JCC
102
Guidelines”) and the Conference of Chief Justices and the Confe103
rence of State Court Administrators (“CCJ/COSCA Guidelines”).
Although the Committees’ advocate opposing positions, both Committees recognize that the judiciary must deny remote electronic
access to certain records in some instances.
The JCC Guidelines recommend that in civil cases, the public
104
should have equal access to both paper and electronic documents.
This recommendation aligns with the proponents’ position advocat105
ing for equal treatment of paper and electronic records.
With respect to criminal cases, however, the JCC Guidelines stipulate that the
public should not have remote electronic access to such cases at
106
present. The recommendations suggest that the Committee revisit
the issue if the Committee learns that the benefits of public access

102

The special Subcommittee was formed upon the request of the Judicial Conference of the United States to its Committee on Court Administration and Case Management directing an examination of the public access doctrine.
JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 1. The Subcommittee consisted of seven
judges and one attorney. Id. Congress created the Judicial Conference of the United States to initiate and review policies governing the administration of the federal
courts. Judicial Conference of the United States, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
judconf.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
103
This project combined the efforts of the Justice Management Institute, the
State Justice Institute, the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of State
Court Administrators, the National Association of Court Management, and the National Center for State Courts. CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at vi. These
bodies endeavored to complete a comprehensive review of state court policies pertaining to the public access doctrine, ultimately drafting the Guidelines to provide a
model policy for states to adopt. Id.
104
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 6. As an exception, the JCC
Guidelines recommend that Social Security cases be exempted from remote electronic access. Id.
105
See supra Part III.A.
106
Id. at 8.
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107

significantly outweigh the dangers.
The Committee reasoned that
safety concerns in criminal cases, including risks to cooperative defendants and law enforcement personnel, outweigh public access
108
rights.
In contrast to the JCC Guidelines, the CCJ/COSCA Guidelines
assert that courts should restrict certain documents from online
109
access based on the nature of the information.
The CCJ/COSCA
Guidelines recommend excluding contact information, Social Security numbers, account numbers, graphic photographs, medical records,
family law records, abuse-and-neglect records, and names of minor
110
children.
In this respect, the Committee agrees with the opponents’ arguments by advocating for differential treatment of paper
111
and electronic records.
IV. NEW JERSEY’S RESPONSE TO REMOTE ELECTRONIC ACCESS
TO COURT DOCUMENTS
Just as state and federal courts across the nation addressed their
public access doctrines in the face of changing technologies, New Jersey took action to review its rule governing public access to court
documents. Amended Rule 1:38 represents a fundamental change in
the public access doctrine as compared to the former Rule’s framework because it endorses a presumption of openness unless exempted. Although the amended Rule’s provisions do not address Internet accessibility explicitly, the Committee’s recommendations,
adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, discuss the gradual evolution of remote electronic accessibility. Consistent with the Rule’s
transformation, existing New Jersey case law advances a presumption
of open access to court proceedings and documents.
A. Former and Amended Rule 1:38
Similar to courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions, New Jersey has recently considered the arguments in support of and against
permitting remote electronic access to court documents. In 2006,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey charged the
107

Id.
Id.
109
CCJ/COSCA GUIDELINES, supra note 73, at 1 (“The nature of certain information in some court records, however, is such that remote public access to the information in electronic form may be inappropriate, even though public access at the
courthouse is maintained.”).
110
Id. at 40.
111
See supra Part III.B.
108
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Supreme Court Special Committee on Public Access to Court
Records (the “Committee”) to conduct a comprehensive review of
112
New Jersey’s rules regarding public access to court records.
This
was not the first time that the court addressed technology’s ability to
transform the public access doctrine. In 1994, the Information Systems Policy Committee, in conjunction with a special subcommittee
113
on public access, issued a report that the court adopted in 1996.
The report concluded that, because electronic information is as pub114
lic as paper records, court information should be available online.
At the time, however, technological limitations created obstacles to
115
posting court information on the Internet.
Now that technological advancements offer a practical solution
to previous obstacles preventing remote electronic access, New Jersey
unsurprisingly reevaluated its public access laws. This time, the court
focused its assessment on Rule 1:38, which governs the public access
doctrine in New Jersey. Pursuant to the Committee’s report and recommendations, the supreme court adopted amended Rule 1:38 on
116
July 22, 2009, which became effective on September 1, 2009.
The
changes from former Rule 1:38 to amended Rule 1:38 are significant
and represent a fundamental change in New Jersey’s public access
117
doctrine.
Former Rule 1:38, as compared to the amended Rule, was narrow and incomplete. Former Rule 1:38 defined court records available for public access as only those records that were “required by statute or rule to be made, maintained or kept on file by any court,
118
office or official within the judicial branch.”
The Rule proceeded
112

Letter from Barry T. Albin, Associate Justice and Chair of the Supreme Court
Special Committee on Public Access to Court Records, Supreme Court of New Jersey,
to Stuart Rabner, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey, at i (Nov. 29, 2007),
available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/publicaccess/publicaccess.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner].
113
REPORT, supra note 7, at 26–27.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
117
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (“This approach [amended Rule 1:38] is a significant departure from the current version of Rule 1:38 . . . . The proposed rule is intended to replace the common law ‘balancing of interests’ test with an absolute right
of access to all non-exempt court and administrative records.”). Under the former
Rule, if a request for access fell outside the scope of Rule 1:38, the requester would
have to assert a common law right of access claim and the court would have to balance the parties’ interests. Id. at 34. Under the amended Rule, an absolute right exists unless explicitly exempted. Id.
118
N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (1969) (amended 2009) (“All records which are required by
statute or rule to be made, maintained or kept on file by any court, office, or official
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to list ten exceptions for records exempted from public access. Despite the listed exceptions, several other exceptions were scattered
120
throughout the court rules, statutes, and case law.
In contrast to former Rule 1:38, amended Rule 1:38 attempts to
address many of the inadequacies and inconsistencies plaguing New
Jersey’s public access doctrine. The Committee undertook its review
with the general presumption that court records are open to the pub121
lic.
In fact, the amended Rule presumes that court records are
open to the public unless exempted, and the amended Rule codifies
122
all of the allowable exceptions to this presumption. The amended
Rule’s policy statement pronounces that court records “within the
custody and control of the judiciary are open for public inspection
123
and copying except as otherwise provided in this rule.” While the
exceptions to this general presumption of openness are numerous,
the amended Rule indicates that “[e]xceptions enumerated in this
rule shall be narrowly construed in order to implement the policy of
124
open access to records of the judiciary.”
within the judicial branch of government shall be deemed a public record and shall
be available for public inspection and copying, as provided by law, except . . . .”).
119
N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (a)–(j). The exceptions excluded personnel and pension
records, criminal, family, and probation records, completed jury questionnaires and
the preliminary lists of jurors, records required to be kept confidential under statute,
rule, or court order, records pertaining to pretrial intervention programs, cases approved for mediation, reports by judges that are submitted to the Administrative Director of the Courts, records maintained by the Judicial Performance Committee,
and certain discovery materials relating to pre-indictment discovery, prearraignment
conferences, plea offers, arraignment/status conferences, pretrial hearings, and pretrial conferences. Id.
120
Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner, supra note 112, at i.
121
Id.; see also REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (“An open and transparent court system
is an integral part of our democratic form of government.”).
122
Letter from Justice Albin to Chief Justice Rabner, supra note 112, at i.
123
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-1 (2009). Court records are defined as:
(1) any information maintained by a court in any form in connection
with a case or judicial proceeding, including but not limited to pleadings, motions, briefs and their respective attachments, evidentiary exhibits, indices, calendars, and dockets; (2) any order, judgment, opinion, or decree related to a judicial proceeding, (3) any official
transcript or recording of a public judicial proceeding, in any form; (4)
any information in a computerized case management system created or
prepared by the court in connection with a case or judicial proceeding;
(5) any record made or maintained by a Surrogate as a judicial officer.
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-2.
124
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-1. For the most part, the various exceptions in the amended
Rule embody all of the exceptions listed in the former Rule, along with additional
provisions. Compare N.J. CT. R. 1:38 (a)–(j) (1969), with N.J. CT. R. 1:38-3 (a)–(f)
(2009). It is worth noting how a rule that provides for more exceptions to access can
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Two significant departures from the former Rule to the
amended Rule involve the amended Rule’s mandatory redaction of
confidential personal identifiers (“CPIs”) and the sealing procedure.
Amended Rule 1:38 requires parties to redact CPIs from any documents submitted to the court, including Social Security numbers,
driver’s license numbers, vehicle plate numbers, insurance policy
numbers, active financial account numbers, and active credit card
125
numbers.
Additionally, the amended Rule explicitly establishes a
standard for sealing court records by codifying the common law test
126
of good cause.
More so, amended Rule 1:38 also provides for the
unsealing of court records by motion and places the burden on the
non-movant to prove that good cause to continue sealing the record
127
still exists. Former Rule 1:38 made no direct reference to redaction
requirements for confidential information or sealing and unsealing
procedures.
Although the provisions in amended Rule 1:38 do not address
Internet posting explicitly, the Committee’s recommendations, ultimately approved by the supreme court, suggest that the judiciary con128
sider posting court documents on the Internet.
The fundamental
change from former Rule 1:38 to the creation of a presumption of
openness unless exempted in amended Rule 1:38 fuels the question
of how far this presumption carries in the context of Internet posting.
Notably, the Committee emphasized that not all records are appro-

still result in greater access. The exceptions in the amended Rule are the only restrictions placed on public access in the universe of court records. The former Rule
mandated public access only to records required to be made or maintained by the
judiciary and further restricted access by providing for exceptions.
125
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(a) (2009). The Rule permits that an “active financial account
number may be identified by the last four digits when the financial account is the
subject of the litigation and cannot otherwise be identified,” or, in the case of other
personal identifiers, when statutes, rules, administrative directives, or court order requires such identifying information to remain in the documents. N.J. CT. R. 1:387(b). The Rule does not require a party to redact a driver’s license number that the
New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission requires to be included in documents relating to the suspension and reinstatement of licenses. N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(e).
126
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(a)–(b). The Rule defines good cause as when “(1)
[d]isclosure will likely cause a clearly defined and serious injury to any person or entity; and (2) [t]he person’s or entity’s interest in privacy substantially outweighs the
presumption that all court and administrative records are open for public inspection
pursuant to R. 1:38.” N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(b)
127
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-12.
128
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 14 (“As resources permit, the Judiciary should develop and implement a public access system whereby records are made available over
the Internet without charge.”). The recommendations suggest that Internet posting
begin with civil docket and criminal conviction information. Id.
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129

priate for online dissemination.
In particular, the recommendations acknowledge that “there is a difference between releasing electronic records in response to a specific request and actively publish130
ing those records on the Internet.”
Furthermore, the Committee
recognized the tension between public access rights and individual
privacy rights and stated that “[b]ecause of privacy concerns, the Judiciary should proceed cautiously with Internet posting after further
131
study.”
The Committee’s report specifies particular areas where differential treatment of paper and remote electronic records is advisable.
One area involves the content of the information posted on the Internet. The recommendations propose that courts exclude an individual’s full date of birth and home address and include only the
birth year and the municipality and state of residence for remote
electronic records, but not for paper records available at the court132
house.
The Committee reasoned that differential treatment was
appropriate because of concerns about identity theft with mass proli133
Another area
feration of sensitive information over the Internet.
where unequal treatment evolves is in the type of records permitted
for online posting. For instance, the Committee advised against posting family and municipal docket information on the Internet at
134
present until courts conduct further analysis. Additionally, the recommendations advocate for Internet posting of conviction-only crim135
inal-docket information. The Committee expressed concern about
courts publishing information in the case of wrongly accused and
136
overcharged defendants whom the courts have found not guilty.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey responded to the Committee’s report by approving a majority of the recommendations underlying the amendments to Rule 1:38, including all of the recommen-

129

Id. at 12–13 (“[N]ot all electronic records should be posted on the Internet.”).
Id. at 14 (“Internet posting results in a hyper-dissemination of court records,
raising concerns different from those related to specific requests for court records.”).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 35.
134
REPORT, supra note 7, at 14. The recommendations do not specify who should
conduct further analysis, although the Committee did recommend that the Administrative Director appoint a permanent Advisory Committee on Public Access. Id. at
59. The Administrative Director and the Advisory Committee would work with the
supreme court to address future concerns regarding public access to court documents. Id. at 9–10.
135
Id. at 15.
136
Id. at 54–55.
130
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dations involving remote electronic access. The court did, however,
modify and reject some of the other recommendations that were unrelated to Internet access, which complicates the predictability of future outcomes in disputes regarding the public access doctrine and
138
interpretations of the amended Rule.
B. New Jersey Court Decisions
Traditionally, New Jersey courts have determined that the public
has a broad right to inspect court documents, although cases addressing the public access doctrine itself are relatively rare. The cases that
concentrate on the public access doctrine rely on a common law right
of access claim, and courts have made their decisions based on the
common law “balancing of the interests” test. Accordingly, the case
law primarily involves balancing the parties’ interests in the context
of sealing motions and does not readily rely on former Rule 1:38 as a
139
decision-making tool. Nonetheless, understanding the roots of the
public access doctrine in New Jersey is important to assess the potential future impact and consequences of the amended Rule.
In New Jersey, the Legislature recognized the public right to attend judicial proceedings as early as the 1677 Concessions and
140
Agreements of West New Jersey. In 1879, the New Jersey Supreme
Court acknowledged the existence of a public right to inspect court

137

See ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5. The full supreme court reviewed the Committee’s report and subsequently drafted its Administrative Determinations concerning the Committee’s recommendations.
138
Id. For instance, the court broadened the presumption of openness by rejecting the Committee’s recommendation that complaints alleging indictable and disorderly person offenses be deemed confidential. Id. at 7. But the court also narrowed
the presumption by modifying the recommendation concerning financial records of
guardians and requiring that such records remain confidential as to unrelated parties. Id. at 7–8.
139
For reasons why, see supra note 117 and accompanying text. Recently, the New
Jersey Supreme Court relied on Rule 1:38 to justify eliminating the initial pleadings
exception to the fair-report privilege in defamation cases because the exception contradicted the Rule’s principles and purpose with respect to expanding public access
to filed pleadings. Salzano v. North Jersey Media Group Inc., 993 A.2d 778, 790 (N.J.
2010).
140
Hammock v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 553 (N.J. 1995); see generally
1677 Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., American Bar Foundation, 1959) (“That in all
publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons,
inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend the said courts, and
hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in any covert manner.”).
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documents when it awarded a citizen the right to inspect tax records
141
subject to litigation.
The leading case on the public access doctrine in New Jersey is
142
Hammock v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc.
In Hammock, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that there was a common law presumption of public access to court documents, and the court established a reasonableness standard to determine when a party properly rebuts the
143
presumption. The court noted that the presumption applies to all
materials filed with the court if they are relevant to any material issue
144
in the case.
After the Hammock decision, the lower courts indirectly addressed the presumption of open access in the context of Internet
accessibility. In Smith v. Smith, the court warned that “[l]ooming
technological developments may warrant the judiciary to reconsider,
prospectively, the current balance of interests in favor of open court
145
proceedings.”
The court emphasized that technology permits remote research by “prospective employers, business associates, loan officers, government regulators, social clubs, and perhaps even would146
be Saturday night dates.” Nearly five years later and with the aid of
amended Rule 1:38, the time has come for the judiciary to determine

141

Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 339 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1879).
The present controversy relates to a matter of public police of universally recognized importance, concerning a traffic which, in the opinion
of many, largely adds to the disorders of society and the burdens of
taxation; and it cannot be alleged that private interests are not as much
involved in its due regulation by law as they are in other public questions about which heretofore individuals have maintained a standing in
this court.

Id.
142

662 A.2d 546, 546 (N.J. 1995).
Id. at 556. The court outlined that the need for secrecy must be specific to
each document and must be based on a current justification for privacy protection.
Id. at 559.
144
Id. at 558–59.
145
879 A.2d 768, 775–76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2004). “It is not hard to imagine that each scurrilous allegation contained in some court filing could eventually
turn up in a ‘Google search.’” Id. at 775.
146
Id. at 775. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in conviction information, despite an expungement order, because court documents are widely disseminated and available for public access over the Internet. G.D. v. Kenny, A-85 (September Term 2009), 2011 N.J. LEXIS 87, at *39–40 (N.J. Jan. 31, 2011) (“The
expungement statute—enacted at a time when law enforcement and court documents may have been stored in the practical obscurity of a file room—now must
coexist in a world where information is subject to rapid and mass dissemination.”).
143
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how technology will alter the balance between public access rights
147
and individual privacy rights.
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES RAISED BY
AMENDED RULE 1:38 AND PROPOSED ANSWERS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Amended Rule 1:38 does not reference Internet access to court
148
documents explicitly. This ambiguity challenges any assessment of
the future impact of the Rule as it relates to the public access doctrine. The recommendations promulgated by the Committee and ultimately approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey manifest that
Internet accessibility will come to fruition in the near future. As
courts transition to posting documents on the Internet, however, several unanswered questions and consequences remain. Many of these
consequences echo the concerns of those advocates in favor of placing restrictions on Internet access. Because amended Rule 1:38 fundamentally alters the former Rule and leaves the future of Internet
149
accessibility to the discretion of the supreme court, New Jersey may
face some unique obstacles as it embarks on its quest to provide remote electronic access to the public. Fortunately, by leaving a majority of the implementation policies open to further analysis and review,
the court can create guidelines to ensure compliance with the recommendations and the founding principles of amended Rule 1:38
while simultaneously balancing necessary individual privacy protections.
A. The Necessity for an Enforcement Provision Appended to the
Redaction Requirements
One gap in amended Rule 1:38 that must be addressed pertains
150
to the redaction of confidential personal identifiers (CPIs).
The
147

See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
The recommendations state that, “[t]he statute should not include references
to any specific technology, given the rapidly changing technological environment in
which the courts operate.” ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 9.
149
Id. at 6–7 (“Given the rapid changes in technology, the Supreme Court should
determine on a periodic basis the appropriate court data for posting on the Internet
. . . . The Supreme Court should make those determinations on an administrative
basis without amending the public access rule.”). Whether the supreme court will
view this proclamation as merely a discretionary grant of power or as a responsibility
to remain pro-active and vigilant when monitoring the policy remains unclear. The
language of the statement, particularly the word should, appears to support the latter
interpretation.
150
See N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7 (2009) (“A party shall not set forth confidential personal
identifiers as defined in R. 1:38-7(a) in any document or pleading submitted to the
148
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Rule does not include an enforcement provision for attorneys and
parties who fail to redact. Proper compliance with this provision becomes especially important as the court implements guidelines and
policies to govern the dissemination of information on the Internet.
Because of the wide audience and their ability to easily view court
documents on the Internet, the inadvertent release of confidential
information, such as a Social Security number or an active financial
151
account number, could be devastating to the victim. The court, by
approving the recommendations and provisions of amended Rule
1:38, recognized the importance of concealing such confidential in152
formation from public access in both paper and electronic records.
Amended Rule 1:38 places the burden of redacting CPIs on at153
The Rule retorneys and parties as opposed to court personnel.
quires parties to certify that they have redacted CPIs from any docu154
ments that they have submitted to the court.
But a certification
requirement may not be potent enough to deter negligent filing.
The Rule is unclear about the consequences of providing certification without proper redaction. Two outcomes are likely to result
from this ambiguity. First, courts could choose to adopt the proce155
dure established in Rule 1:4-8. Rule 1:4-8 states that by signing the
court unless otherwise required by statute, rule, administrative directive, or court order . . . .”).
151
See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–
13 (2008) (discussing how the Internet eases the process of data aggregation and
significantly increases the opportunity for identity theft); Identity Theft, THE NAT’L
CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName
=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32359#5 (last visited Dec. 25, 2010) (discussing
the effects of identity theft on victims, including poor credit status, time and effort to
correct mistakes, costs, and psychological scars).
152
See R. 1:38-7 (requiring the redaction of personal identifiers from all documents submitted to the court); see also ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5,
at 1 (indicating that some personal identifiers should remain confidential and
should be redacted from court documents).
153
See R. 1:38-7(c) (declaring that a party must avoid placing CPIs in court documents, and requiring parties to certify pleadings and Case Information Statements in
accordance with the redaction requirements); see also REPORT, supra note 7, at 11
(“Court staff should not be required to redact confidential personal identifiers in existing court records or included in court records filed in the future . . . .”).
154
If a Case Information Statement is required, it must include a certification
statement indicating that CPIs have been redacted. R. 1:38-7(c)(1). If no Case Information Statement is required, parties must, in the first filed pleading, include the
language, “I certify that confidential personal identifiers have been redacted from
documents now submitted to the court, and will be redacted from all documents
submitted in the future in accordance with Rule 1:38-7(b).” Id. R. 1:38-7(c)(2).
155
N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 (1994). This Rule governs frivolous litigation in the form and
execution of papers. Id.

MAKAR_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

6/16/2011 2:58 PM

COMMENT

1099

document, the attorney certifies that he has read the document and
156
that the information is accurate.
If no signature appears or if the
signed document contains deficiencies, the document is stricken and
157
an adverse party or the court may seek sanctions. In the case of a
party’s failure to redact information in violation of the certification
requirement, courts could apply a similar rationale to Rule 1:4-8 and
equate the certification with the signature of approval of the truthfulness and accuracy of the document. Alternatively, a client injured
as a result of an attorney’s failure to redact the proper CPIs might file
a legal malpractice claim against the negligent attorney.
The problem with these two alternatives is their restrictiveness.
For instance, Rule 1:4-8 benefits only the parties because the parties
are the sole entities—aside from the court itself—in a position to
158
make a motion to impose court-ordered sanctions. Rule 1:4-8 does
not adequately protect third parties who, quite conceivably, are injured by an attorney’s failure to redact their confidential information.
Similarly, malpractice claims are obviously deficient if the individual
affected by the release of the confidential information is not the at159
torney’s client but is in fact a third party.
An enforcement provision specific to the failure to redact in accordance with Rule 1:38 might remedy the inadequacies of the certification requirement and provide stronger protections. Unlike Rule
1:4-8 or a legal malpractice claim, the enforcement provision could
be available not only to clients and parties but also to other persons
involved in the litigation and third persons affected by the non160
compliant party’s negligence. This would ensure protection, or at
least recourse, for the personal information of witnesses and victims

156

N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a).
N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a)–(b).
158
N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(a). Although courts may order sanctions sua sponte, they may
be unwilling to do so for any number of reasons.
159
The New Jersey Supreme Court has loosened the privity requirement obstructing many third-party legal malpractice suits, and held that an attorney has a limited
duty to specific non-clients. Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357–59 (N.J.
1995). The duty extends to third parties whom the attorney should have known
would rely on the lawyer’s professional work. Id. at 1359. A third party affected by
the attorney’s failure to redact would unlikely qualify as a non-client to whom the attorney owes a specific duty, which is a necessary element to assert a legal malpractice
claim.
160
Cf. R. 1:4-8(a)–(b) (stipulating that only an adverse party or the court can raise
the prospect of sanctions); see supra note 159 and accompanying text.
157
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161

identified in the court record.
By expanding the reach of the redaction requirements and the potential liability risks, the enforcement provision might deter carelessness and encourage attentiveness.
An enforcement provision is an especially relevant concern because
the results of a pilot study performed in the federal courts, which authorized remote electronic access to criminal case records, revealed
that a redaction requirement similar to Rule 1:38’s requirement was a
162
disaster to implement. In fact, in certain circumstances, the experience resulted in complete failure to redact any confidential infor163
Rather than comply with
mation from documents posted online.
the redaction requirements, some courts merely added exceptions to
the list of documents excluded from online access because redaction
164
was simply too difficult.
Defense attorneys in several districts reported that courts often waived sanctions for a party’s failure to re165
dact.
Including appropriate penalties in the enforcement provision is
important in order to grant significance to the redaction requirements. For example, the enforcement provision might resemble the
sanctions embodied in N.J. Court Rule 1:20-15A, which governs at166
torney misconduct and discipline. One such sanction may include
reprimand or admonition, but more serious or repetitive violations
167
could result in censure or suspension from the bar. Other penalties
might include sanctions similar to those established in Rule 1:4-8, in168
cluding monetary payments to the court or to the victim. Additionally, the enforcement provision should include language that a showing of actual harm caused by the exposure is not necessary and that
any penalties are prophylactic, available merely on the basis that information required to be redacted under Rule 1:38 was not in fact

161
The names and addresses of victims or alleged victims of domestic abuse or
sexual offenses are statutorily excluded from public access. N.J. CT. R. 1:38-3(c)(12)
(2009).
162
RAUMA, supra note 49, at 12–14.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
N.J. CT. R. 1:20-15A (2009) (describing sanctions and conditions for disciplining members of the bar).
167
See N.J. CT. R. 1:20-15A (3)–(6) (listing examples of possible sanctions for attorney misconduct).
168
N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(b) (1994). As mentioned previously, Rule 1:4-8 is itself insufficient to protect victims from an attorney’s negligent failure to redact CPIs. See supra
note 158 and accompanying text. But, the type of sanctions listed in the Rule provides a possible framework for the creation of an enforcement provision.
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redacted. Requiring victims to show actual harm to punish negligent
attorneys and litigants who violated a court rule is insulting.
B. RESTRICTING INTERNET ACCESS TO COURT-GENERATED
DOCUMENTS ONLY
Another consequence of New Jersey’s transition towards remote
electronic access to court documents is the possibility of increased lit169
igation, particularly in the form of sealing motions.
Conceivably,
parties worried about shielding their information from public viewership on the Internet will run to courts to request sealing orders. Even
with the redaction requirements, the category of CPIs is quite limited,
and embarrassing and sensitive information will most likely fall outside the reach of the redaction requirements. In the past, parties re170
lied on practical obscurity to protect their interests, mitigating the
need for greater protections beyond the occasional sealing orders requested for particularly sensitive information. But as the Internet
threatens to erode practical obscurity, the litigation strategy is changing and forcing parties to pursue additional judicial mechanisms to
protect information that was, at one time, virtually hidden from public inspection.
Rule 1:38 establishes a lofty standard to seal records, which further complicates the problem. The test requires the existence of
good cause, which is present only when disclosure will cause a serious
and specific injury and the individual’s privacy substantially outweighs
171
the public’s right to access. While this standard essentially codifies
172
the prior common law test, it may theoretically result in a stricter
standard because the Rule now expresses an absolute presumption of
openness unless exempted. Moreover, the Rule provides for an unsealing procedure and places the burden on the proponent to prove
173
that good cause still exists to justify maintaining the seal.

169

See Winn, supra note 48, at 326.
Id. at 316 (“The ‘practical obscurity’ of old records generates an expectation of
privacy that has been recognized as legitimate by common law courts.”).
171
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-11(a)–(b) (2009).
172
REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
173
N.J. CT. R. 1:38-12. The “reverse burden” was adopted by the court based on
its decision in Hammock. REPORT, supra note 7, at 44. In Hammock, the court determined that
[t]he person with the burden of proof [the proponent for continued
sealing] must present evidence to show why public access to the documents should be denied currently rather than rely on the fact that a
protective order was entered earlier. When a person intervenes in a
case to inspect and copy documents that have been sealed, a reassess170
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With a more stringent sealing standard and the threat of public
exposure looming large, two circumstances are likely to occur. First,
174
parties may fail to make a complete record to preserve their privacy.
This raises due process concerns about the right to a fair trial when a
party must choose between privacy and fairness. Second, parties with
adequate resources might turn to private forums, including ADR al175
ternatives, to settle their disputes. While this scenario may lighten
the courts’ workloads, particularly as courts are already overcrowded
and overburdened, the negative consequences outweigh the benefits.
Specifically, this situation presents concerns about economic discrim176
ination and threatens the integrity of the judicial system. If a consequence of the Rule is that it promotes the use of private resolution
mechanisms because the public feels that the courts are inadequate
to protect its interests, then the public trust in the judiciary is negatively affected. This is perverse because the goal of the Rule is to in177
crease judicial transparency and public confidence in courts.
One solution to combat the increase in sealing motions and the
migration to private forums is to restrict Internet access to courtgenerated documents only, including opinions, judgments, dockets,
178
indexes, and calendars. Many courts, including the New Jersey state
179
courts, already post some of these documents on their websites.
The benefit of this compromise is two-fold: it preserves judicial transparency and balances individual privacy rights. In particular, it would

ment of whether documents should remain under seal must be based
on a current justification for privacy.
Hammock v. Hoffmann-Laroche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 559 (N.J. 1995) (emphasis added).
174
See Salzmann, supra note 74, at 377 (“Individuals will be hard pressed to release
personal information to the government if they believe that information will be distributed around the world.”).
175
Marder, supra note 85, at 444–45.
176
See text accompanying note 84.
177
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 30, 44 (declaring that transparency is the guiding
principle supporting the Rule and that public trust and confidence in the judiciary is
only achieved through open access to court documents).
178
See Sudbeck, supra note 80, at 119–20 (arguing to restrict Internet access to
court-generated documents only because such a policy would still demonstrate to the
public how the judiciary is functioning, which is one of the central tenets of the public access doctrine).
179
REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that since its launch in 1995, the Judiciary
Website includes decisions of all New Jersey state courts, “the Rules of the Court, jury
charges, legal forms, and step-by-step kits for self-represented litigants”). For examJUDICIARY,
ples
of
the
materials,
see
New
Jersey
Courts,
N.J.
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
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protect the long-established expectation of practical obscurity and
discourage parties from zealously seeking sealing orders or resorting
to private forums. Additionally, this recommendation is consistent
with the presumption of openness because the entire case file would
181
remain available at the courthouse.
For further review, the interested public could still opt to travel to the courthouse to retrieve the
complete paper record.
C. Questions of Timing
1.

Limiting the Time Frame for Release to Records Filed
After September 1, 2009

One of the unanswered questions evinced in the wake of Rule
1:38’s ambiguities concerns the timing for Internet posting. The recommendations pronounce that the redaction requirements for CPIs
182
apply prospectively.
Neither the Rule nor the recommendations
address whether and to what extent courts will place old records on
the Internet without the protections offered by the redaction requirements. Prior to the enactment of amended Rule 1:38 in July
2009, parties did not necessarily expect to discover their cases files
displayed on the Internet, and therefore, parties may have relied on
practical obscurity in lieu of taking more proactive steps to protect
their private information, such as seeking to seal certain docu183
ments.
One possible resolution is to limit the time frame for release.
Specifically, the guidelines should clarify that court records filed be184
fore September 1, 2009—the effective date of amended Rule 1:38 —
are not eligible for Internet posting. Not only would posting prior
records compromise expectations of privacy, but it would also place
180
See Sudbeck, supra note 80, at 121 (“Requiring the public to access these files in
the courthouse rather than in their living room will provide some protection to this
public information, as is currently provided by the concept of the ‘practical obscurity’ of these files in the clerks’ offices.”).
181
Id. at 119–20 (advocating for courts to permit electronic public access to all
documents at public terminals located in the courthouse, which eases public accessibility and administrative convenience).
182
REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
183
Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the recommendations of
the Information Systems Policy Committee in 1996, which implicated the judiciary’s
desire to expand the public access doctrine to include the Internet, the technological reality at the time was dubious. Id. at 26–27. Therefore, parties likely would still
suspect that their private information would continue to be hidden by practical obscurity.
184
ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS, supra note 5, at 1.
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burdens on court personnel to transform paper records into elec185
tronic form or electronic records into compatible data forms. Additionally, parties have not been required to redact prior records, and
forcing upon court personnel the overwhelming task to sift through
prior records to redact sensitive information is plainly contrary to the
186
Rule’s designation of redaction burdens.
In the worst-case scenario, courts could post prior records containing personal identifiers,
which would certainly lead to abuse and criminal mischief. Again,
this recommendation will not compromise the public access doctrine
because prior records will remain available in full at the courthouse.
2.

Establishing a Time Schedule that Permits Immediate
Remote Electronic Access to Limited Documents upon
Filing

Another timing concern involves determining at what stage in
the proceedings courts will be required to release particular documents. For instance, if the presumption of openness applies immediately upon filing, then courts must make documents available in
real time for public inspection in the courthouse or over the Inter187
net. This would permit access prior to any actual proceedings taking place, at least with respect to pleadings, discovery, and pre-trial
motions. One major concern is that premature release will create
188
pre-trial publicity and prejudice the jury.
This prospect threatens
the integrity of the court process, and it impinges upon the founding
189
principles of fairness and justice. Because of the concern about the
spread of pretrial information, applying the same timing principle for
both paper and electronic records is appropriate. This notion, how185

See Daniel J. Lynch, Litigation: Assessing the Electronic Case Filing Experience in the
District of New Hampshire, 47 N.H. BUS. J. 12, 16 (2006) (discussing how electronic filing has increased the time-intensive workload of intake and case managers, particularly because court personnel must scan and upload paper records into the computer
system to create an electronic docket). The question is whether this would even be
practicable, particularly for county courts, which are already overtaxed with their
current workloads.
186
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 (“Court staff should not be required to redact
confidential personal identifiers in existing court records or included in court
records filed in the future . . . .”).
187
For example, the federal PACER system posts case information on its Internet
server in real time, once the information is updated in a court’s case management
system.
Frequently Asked Questions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/faq.html#AR6 (click on “Case Related” tab and then
“How Soon after a document is filed will it be in PACER?”) (last visited Dec. 25,
2010). For more information on the PACER system, see infra note 201.
188
Carpinello, supra note 82, at 1108.
189
See id.
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ever, is more pressing in light of Internet accessibility because of the
relative ease and simplicity with which potential jurors and news
190
broadcasters could access such information.
The results create a
serious interference with justice and hinder the ability of courts to
perform their duties effectively. In addition, if courts release the
records immediately upon filing, parties do not have any lag time to
seek a motion to seal sensitive information or correct mistakes. Once
released, the damaging information is available to the entire public,
regardless of whether the information was eligible for sealing under
Rule 1:38.
Three possible sets of time schedules exist to guide courts. First,
courts could release documents immediately upon filing. As previously noted, this is inadequate to protect the case from pretrial ex191
posure.
Another approach is to release all records, both at the
courthouse and on the Internet, only after final adjudication of the
matter. This time schedule provides lag time for the parties to make
a motion to seal information they hope to protect before courts release it to the public. This answer is not without tribulations, however, because cases today are heavily motion-based and the stages lead192
ing to the trial are quite prolonged.
Unless the motion is
dispositive, such as a summary judgment motion, courts may not release the case records for a substantial period of time after the parties
193
file their initial pleadings. A third middle-ground approach would
require courts to release records available at the courthouse immediately upon filing while delaying the release of the entire record on
the Internet, possibly until final disposition. Courts could release
certain information, such as court-generated documents, on the In194
ternet immediately.
This approach maintains the presumption of
openness while alleviating many of the timing concerns because the
limited online materials immediately provide the interested public
with enough information to seek complete files at the courthouse.

190

Flood, supra note 83, at 431; Schwartz, supra note 83.
See supra notes 82–83, 188 & 190 and accompanying text.
192
Statistics from New Jersey indicate that the case processing time from filing to
disposition for civil cases at the trial level range from 12–24 months, depending on
the track. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CASE PROCESSING TIME STANDARDS IN STATE
COURTS, 2007 app. B (2009), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=1409.pdf. For criminal cases at
the trial level, the time from complaint to pre-indictment disposition is two months,
while the time from indictment to post-indictment disposition is four months. Id.
193
See id. (discussing the case processing times in New Jersey trial courts).
194
See supra Part V.B.
191
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This timing schedule also protects much of the information from hyper-dissemination on the Internet prior to final judgment.
D. Establishing a Fee System to Offset Costs
Rule 1:38 raises an additional unanswered question regarding
the creation and maintenance of an Internet database and associated
costs. Neither the recommendations nor the provisions of Rule 1:38
specify how to create and maintain the appropriate databases or how
the judiciary will fund the project. The issue of cost arises in a time
of financial strife and as the State of New Jersey has an outstanding
195
debt of nearly $35 million.
The cost issue is significant because it
ultimately affects the taxpayers and the general public.
One suggestion to assist with the costs of providing remote electronic access, advocated by proponents of equal access for paper and
electronic records, is to privatize the task of creating and maintaining
196
the databases. Privatizing database management, however, leads to
several different issues, including the extent to which the private
sponsors might actually restrict access through usage costs and user
197
provisions. Clearly, this would defeat the purpose of the amended
198
Rule, which is to open up the channels for public access.
Another suggestion is to charge user fees for Internet access to
199
court documents. The benefit of access fees is that such fees would
help the State recover the significant costs involved in creating and
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to provide Internet accessi-

195
Dustan A. McNichol, A Budget Weighed Down by Old Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
2009, at NJ1.
196
See text accompanying note 70.
197
See Gomez-Velez, supra note 98, at 417 (“[T]he primary concern should not be
in the provision of wider (or ‘jazzier’) public access by private vendors but rather
should be focused on providing effective access and avoiding circumstances under
which private vendors might seek to ‘privatize’ and restrict access to public information.”); Martin, supra note 37, at 880 (“By leaving court data in the custody of a private firm, however, the outsourcing of electronic filing and document management
systems opens a completely new set of issues around public access . . . .”).
198
See REPORT, supra note 7, at 25 (discussing the context for the public access policy and the amended Rule as requiring an open court system to enhance a democratic society).
199
The Committee considered the question of user fees to help recover the costs
associated with initiating Internet access, but recommended that the judiciary conduct a cost-benefit analysis before making any decision regarding fees. Id. at 50. The
Committee determined that the records should be posted without charge until such
analysis is performed, at which time the judiciary should revisit the question of user
fees. Id.
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bility.
Additionally, charging a modest access fee will likely deter
mischievous and casual perusal while still providing access to interested individuals. An example of a successful fee system is the federal
201
PACER system.
PACER charges users $0.08 per page that results
from any search, and the fee applies irrespective of whether or not
202
the user views, prints, or downloads the pages.
E. Creating a Login Mechanism
One additional suggestion that relates generally to guide the
process of providing remote electronic access to court documents is
to permit access only to those users who have registered and received
a username and password. The login mechanism has two benefits: it
creates an electronic trail to track viewers in case a problem does
203
arise, and it deters wandering eyes from viewing sensitive information with the intent to abuse it. Again, the PACER system provides an
appropriate example of what a login procedure might entail. PACER
requires a user to register with their personal information to obtain
login and password information necessary to access the Internet post204
ings.
VI. CONCLUSION
As technology continues to develop, federal and state courts
must decide how technology will affect public access rights. The introduction of the Internet into the public access doctrine amplifies
the inherent tension between public access rights and individual privacy rights in the context of First Amendment and common law right

200

See D. MASS. R. 4.5 app. A (2007) (installing an electronic-public access fee
schedule, in accordance with Congress and the Judicial Conference, mandating federal courts to charge user fees to fund and provide electronic access to the PACER
system); Alabama State Bar, AOC Now Charges AlaCourt Subscribers Per-Page Fee, 70 ALA.
LAW. 139, 139 (2009) (indicating that Alabama state courts must now charge a fee for
electronic access to court documents because the combination of electronic storage
and budgetary constraints is cost prohibitive without generating such funds).
201
Public Access to Court Electronic Records Overview, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/pacerdesc.html (last visited Dec. 25, 2010).
PACER is the federal version of an electronic-public access service permitting users
to access court documents over the Internet. Id.
202
Frequently Asked Questions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (click on the “How much does PACER cost?
link) (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
203
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 64, at 6.
204
Public Access to Court Electronic Records, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.pacer.gov/ (click on the “How Do I Access PACER” tab) (last visited
Mar. 22, 2011).
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of access claims. When courts post documents on the Internet, it exacerbates the opportunity for hyper-dissemination and misuse of the
information as compared to the practical obscurity protecting documents available at the courthouse. In several opinions, the Supreme
Court of the United States has insinuated that the analysis requires
different privacy rights and varying levels of privacy as technology alters the legal landscape in the public access doctrine.
In July 2009, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted
amended Rule 1:38 and approved the recommendations promulgated by its self-appointed Committee thereby fundamentally altering its
public access doctrine. The amended Rule’s explicit, absolute presumption of openness unless specifically exempted, fashions unanswered questions and specific consequences that the supreme court
must address as it endeavors to create a policy for posting court documents on the Internet. Although the Rule does not address Internet posting explicitly in its provisions, the recommendations approved by the court urge the judiciary to begin posting certain documents online for remote electronic access by the public leaving it to
the court to construct policy guidelines to govern Internet accessibility.
Because traditional access to court documents at the courthouse
differs from remote electronic access over the Internet and because
the policy is relatively undefined, several unanswered questions and
consequences arise that the court must address when it implements
its policies to balance public access rights and privacy rights. The
questions and consequences focus on the enforcement of the redaction requirements, increased litigation burdening courts, the timing
schedules for release of court documents over the Internet, and the
costs of providing Internet accessibility. This Comment made recommendations and proposed solutions to these issues, including advocating for the creation of an enforcement provision for failure to
redact, maintaining a policy of posting only court-generated documents online, creating an appropriate time schedule for release,
charging user fees to offset costs, and requiring a login procedure
with username and password information.
By considering these recommendations and resolutions, the
court will ensure a healthy balance between public access rights and
individual privacy rights even in the face of technological advancements. In response to Dr. Malcolm’s warning, venture capitalist John
Hammond retorted, “How could we stand the light of discovery and
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Unfortunately, the law is not as idealistic as a line in a

JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993).

